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ABSTRACT
We construct a model where the equilibrium organization of firms changes as an economy
approaches the world technology frontier. In vertically integrated firms, owners (managers) have
to spend time both on production and innovation activities, and this creates managerial overload, and
discourages innovation. Outsourcing of some production activities mitigates the managerial
overload, but creates a holdup problem, causing some of the rents of the owners to be dissipated to
the supplier. Far from the technology frontier, imitation activities are more important, and vertical
integration is preferred. Closer to the frontier, the value of innovation increases, encouraging
outsourcing.
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A view dating back at least to Gerschenkron (1962) sees considerable diﬀerences in the
organization of ﬁrms and the economy in general between technologically advanced so-
cieties and those that are technological followers. In economies that are technologically
relatively backward, there are more long-term relationships between ﬁrms and banks,
larger, perhaps more vertically integrated, ﬁrms, less competition, greater state inter-
vention, and generally more “rigid” institutions.
In Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002) (henceforth AAZ) we formalize this notion,
and build on it to analyze a range of issues related to technological progress and eco-
nomic growth. We point to a fundamental trade-oﬀ facing all economies, that between
exploiting the experience of already existing ﬁrms, entrepreneurs and managers, versus
achieving greater selection, by weeding out less successful ﬁrms and managers. The
ﬁr s ts t r a t e g y ,w h i c hw ed u binvestment-based growth strategy, maximizes investment by
channeling money to existing ﬁrms and managers, but sacriﬁces innovation. The alter-
native, the innovation-based strategy, encourages innovation at the expense of exploiting
the experience of existing endeavors, and corresponds to a more ﬂuid and competitive
market. We argue that because innovation becomes more important relative to imitation
as a country approaches the world technology frontier, closer to the frontier selecting
highly-skilled managers and entrepreneurs, and the right matches between ﬁrms and
activities, becomes more important. As a result, the economy naturally progresses from
an investment-based equilibrium, where insiders are protected, to an innovation-based
equilibrium, where there is greater selection and termination of less successful ﬁrms and
entrepreneurs. We show how encouraging the investment-based strategy can increase
the growth rate at early stages, but an economy might end up in a non-convergence trap
if it does not switch out of the investment-based strategy.
The current paper is part of the same research program, and explores the relation-
ship between an economy’s distance to the world technology frontier and the internal
organization of the ﬁr m . B a s e do nt h es a m ei d e a sa si nA A Z ,w es h o wt h a tt h e r ea r e
greater incentives for ﬁrms to be vertically integrated in economies farther away from
t h ef r o n t i e r .T h eb r o a d e ra i mo ft h i sr e s e a r c hp r o g r a mi st oi n v e s t i g a t eh o wac o u n t r y ’ s
distance to the world technological frontier impacts on the type of contracts ﬁrms sign
with managers, outside ﬁnanciers, and suppliers, and conversely how these contracts
1may aﬀect economic growth.1
In this paper, we build on Grossman and Hart (1986), who oﬀer a theory of vertical
integration as mitigating the holdup problems between ﬁrms and their suppliers. By
changing asset ownership, and therefore the outside options of various parties, vertical
integration aﬀects how ex post rents will be shared and via this channel, it shapes the
investment incentives of various parties. To this framework, we add issues of managerial
overload, also analyzed in Aghion and Tirole (1997). In our story, the beneﬁts of vertical
integration is that the parent company does not have to share rents with suppliers, as it
will conduct most of its activities in-house. Thec o s to fv e r t i c a li n t e g r a t i o n ,o nt h eo t h e r
hand, is that managerial overload (modeled as convex costs of eﬀort) reduces investments
in certain activities, and especially in innovation-related activities. Building on the same
ideas as in AAZ, we argue that innovation activities become more important as the
economy approaches the world technology frontier. Therefore, at some point it becomes
worthwhile to incur the costs of sharing the rents with others, in order to beneﬁtf r o m
greater innovation by outsourcing some of the production activities.
Admittedly, this story and our model are simple, and they are merely meant to be
illustrative. Yet, we believe that there are important interactions between the internal
organization of the ﬁrm, contracting, and more generally, the organization of production,
on the one hand, and an economy’s stage of development–its distance to the world
technology frontier. We present this model to encourage future work in this area.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the macroeconomic part of the
model and derives the dynamic equation for aggregate productivity. Section 3.1 derives
the equilibrium investments in scale and innovation under vertical integration and non-
integration (outsourcing). Section 3.2 analyzes how ﬁrm owners’ decisions whether or not
to vertically integrate depends upon the country’s distance to the technological frontier.
Section 3.3 shows how persistent integration may lead to non-convergence traps.
1Other than AAZ, this paper is most closely related to the recent literature on growth and con-
tracting, including Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999), Martimort and Verdier (2001), Francois and Roberts
(2001), and Tong and Xu (2001). For example, Martimort and Verdier (2001) and Francois and Roberts
(2001) show how a high rate of creative destruction may discourage long-term relationships within ﬁrms.
H e r e ,w ee m p h a s i z et h et r a d e - o ﬀ between scope and innovation incentives, in a growth model where
the importance of innovation (our equivalent of creative destruction) increases as a country approaches
the technological frontier. This paper also relates to recent work on vertical integration decisions in
international trade, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (2002) or Antras (2002).
22B a s i c s e t u p
2.1 Agents and production
The economy is populated by a continuum of non-overlapping generations of one-period
lived agents. Each generation consists of a mass 1 of “capitalists” who hold initial
property rights over “production sites”, and a mass 1+L of workers that can also be
employed as managers. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor which she supplies
inelastically with no disutility. All individuals are risk neutral.
T h e r ei sau n i q u eﬁn a lg o o dw h i c hs e r v e sa sn u m e r a i r ea n di sp r o d u c e dc o m p e t i t i v e l y











where st (v)At (ν) is the productivity in sector ν at time t, xt(ν) is the ﬂow of interme-
diate good ν used in ﬁnal good production again at time t,a n dα ∈ [0,1]. st (v) will be
the component of productivity coming from ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments, and At (ν) is the
state of technology in this sector, determined by imitation and innovation activities.
In each intermediate sector ν, one intermediate producer can produce 1 unit of inter-
mediate good with leading-edge productivity At (ν),u s i n g1u n i to fﬁnal good as capital.
Firm-speciﬁc investments and productivity improvements are decided at the beginning
of the period. Ex post each intermediate good producer faces a competitive fringe of
imitators that forces her to charge a limit price: pt (ν)=χ. Hence, proﬁts for each
intermediate sector ﬁrm is πt (ν)=( pt (ν) − 1)xt (v). Substituting for the limit price
and the proﬁt-maximizing choice of xt (v), we have equilibrium monopoly proﬁts as:
πt (ν)=δst (v)At (ν)L (2)
where δ ≡ (χ − 1)χ
− 1
1−α is a measure of the degree of competition in the economy, and
is monotonically increasing in χ.W h e nχ,o re q u i v a l e n t l yδ, is high, which in turn may
be due to technological reasons or to government regulation, there is less competitive






as the average productivity in the country at date t, At t h ep r o d u c t i v i t ya tt h ew o r l d





as an (inverse) measure of the country’s distance to the technological frontier.
2.2 Productivity growth
Before production takes place at any date, intermediate ﬁrms can increase productivity,
either by imitating frontier technologies or by innovating upon existing technologies in
the country. Imitation is automatic, but innovation requires investments and skills on
the part of entrepreneurs/managers, and the success of innovation will vary between
ﬁr m sa n do v e rt i m e .M o r es p e c i ﬁcally, we assume:
At (ν)=η ¯ At−1 + γt (ν)At−1, (5)
and that
γt (ν)=γ + x(v). (6)
In this equation, we can interpret xt (v) as the probability that an innovation in sector
v at time t is successful. If so, there is innovation in the amount 1+γ. Otherwise, there
is a smaller innovation, of size γ. These innovations build on the knowledge stock of
the country, thus they multiply At−1.T h eﬁrst term in (5), on the other hand, reﬂects
imitation from the world technology frontier, hence the term ¯ At−1.
Let us focus on a symmetric equilibrium where all intermediate ﬁrms in the same
country will choose the same innovative intensity xt (ν)=x. Then, dividing both sides
of the above equation by ¯ At−1, and integrating over ν, we obtain a simple linear equation












where g is the growth rate of world technology frontier.2
Equation (7) is a simpler version of the productivity growth equation in AAZ. The
basic analysis in AAZ boiled down to comparing various equilibrium organizational
choices, aﬀecting the η and x terms in (7). Relying on experience increases η at the
2That the ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment, s, does not contribute to technological progress is inessential for
the results.
4expense of x, whereas choosing the innovation-based strategy increases x at the expense
of η. As the economy approaches the world technology frontier, a,i n c r e a s e s ,a n ds e -
lection and innovation become more important. This in turn tilts the balance towards
organizational choices that favor selection and innovation. In AAZ, the major decision
was whether or not to terminate less successful ﬁrms and managers. Here we will look
at a complementary decision, that of whether to vertically integrate certain production
activities or to outsource them (and in addition, the vertical integration decision here
will only aﬀect x and not η, but see footnote 7).
3 Distance to frontier, vertical integration, and convergence
3.1 A simple model of vertical integration versus outsourcing
We now analyze the vertical integration decision of (intermediate sector) ﬁrms. These
ﬁrms (or their owners/the capitalists) can either choose a “vertically integrated” struc-
ture, in which they carry out both the production and innovation activities. Alter-
natively, they can contract out either part of the production activities or innovation
activities. Here, because of page limits, we focus only on the case of outsourcing pro-
duction activities. The basic idea is that investment in the scale of production and
innovation both require eﬀort, and perhaps more important time and focus. In the
vertically-integrated structure, this creates managerial overload. Outsourcing mitigates
the managerial overload, but at the same time, it creates a holdup problem:3 an e w
agent is brought in, who will share some of the rents with the owner, thereby reducing
the owner’s income for given eﬀort, and via this channel, also his incentives to invest.
We model managerial overload by introducing a convex cost of eﬀo r t ;t h em o r ee ﬀort
the manager (or the owner) exerts, the higher is the marginal cost of further eﬀort. More
formally, consider the following cost function for eﬀort in the case of vertically-integrated
3Following Grossman and Hart (1986) and the incomplete contracts literature, we assume that no
ex ante contract can induce an enforceable division of surplus; sharing of proﬁts must rely entirely upon
ex post bargaining. In addition, here we do not consider the case where the owner does not outsource,
but hires the supplier as an employee. Presumably, to the extent that this employee makes important
investments for the ﬁrm, he will have ex post bargaining power, but would still need to be monitored by
the owner. This makes the organizational form where the supplier is hired as an employee of the ﬁrm
an intermediate organization between our vertically-integrated structure and outsourcing. We leave a





k ¯ At−1 if s + x ≤ T
∞ otherwise .
This cost function speciﬁes that there is a constant ﬁxed cost k ¯ At−1 (which grows with
the state the world technology to ensure balanced growth), and there is 0 marginal cost
of eﬀort until s+x reaches T, and thereafter, the marginal cost is inﬁnite. Hence, we have
an L-shaped–thus extremely convex–marginal cost curve. The intuitive motivation for
this function is that the manager (owner) has a total available time of T, and expanding
the scale of production takes 1 unit of time, and innovation activities also take 1 unit
of time. Once these activities take up all the available time, the manager can no longer
increase his eﬀort.
We assume that
η + γ ≥ T>γ. (A1)
The ﬁrst part of the assumption ensures that the owner has “scarce” time, so that
the trade-oﬀs emphasized here are more interesting. The second part is important in
making sure that there will be suﬃcient innovation from devoting time to innovation-
type activities, for example by outsourcing.
The maximization problem of the owners of integrated ﬁr m si ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r d :
choose (s,x) to maximize
πt (ν)=δst (v)At (ν)L − Ct (s,x)=δLs(η +( γ + x)a) ¯ At−1 − Ct(s,x),
where the second equality makes use of the fact that all ﬁr m sw i l lc h o o s et h es a m ex
and s, and substitutes for At (ν) using (4) and (5).
Assumption (A1), i.e., the scarcity of managerial time, then immediately implies that
the optimum x must be equal to zero.4 In other words, in the vertically-integrated ﬁrm,
eﬀort overload discourages innovation. The optimal scale of production is then simply:




VI(a) ¯ At−1 =
¡
δLT(η + γa) − k
¢ ¯ At−1. (8)
4The ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution yields:
s =
η + γa + Ta
2a
.
As u ﬃcient condition for s ≥ T, and hence for x =0 ,i sη + γ ≥ T, which is ensured by assumption
(A1).
6Now consider the case where production activities are outsourced to an independent




βk ¯ At−1 if s ≤ T
∞ otherwise .
In other words, the supplier also has total time T, which he simply allocates to produc-
tive activities, and incurs a ﬁxed cost βk ¯ At−1, which is a fraction of the ﬁxed cost of
production incurred by the vertically-integrated ﬁrm. Once these production activities





φk ¯ At−1 if x ≤ T
∞ otherwise .
Therefore, the owner can now allocate all her time to innovation activities, and incurs a
ﬁxed cost of production φk ¯ At−1. We assume that φ ≥ 1/2, so the owner incurs a ﬁxed
cost at least half as large the ﬁxed cost in the vertical-integrated case (this assumption
simpliﬁes some of the comparisons below, and is not essential). We also assume that
suppliers can still work as workers, so even in the case with outsourcing, the total labor
f o r c ew o r k i n gi nt h ei n t e r m e d i a t es e c t o ri se q u a lt oL.
Following Grossman and Hart (1986) and the incomplete contracts literature, we
assume that scale and productivity decisions are ex post unveriﬁable by third parties
and therefore cannot be contracted upon ex ante. Thus the owner and the supplier must
rely on ex post bargaining to determine how proﬁts will be shared between them. This
creates a standard holdup problem: ex post some of the rents have to be shared with the
supplier. To simplify the discussion, we assume that both the owner and the supplier
have an outside option equal to zero (i.e., once productive activities are outsourced, and
investment decisions are taken, the owner can no longer carry out productive activities
if there is disagreement). Assuming equal bargaining power between the owner and the




δLs(η +( γ + x)a) ¯ At−1.





δLs(η +( γ + x)a) ¯ At−1 − C
x(x),
5Throughout we assume that this surplus is large enough to cover the ﬁxed cost for the supplier.
7while taking the innovation intensity x is given, the supplier will invest in the scale of





δLs(η +( γ + x)a) ¯ At−1 − C
s(s).




Notice that in this case, the non-cooperative nature of the game between the supplier
and the owner does not create underinvestment, since the marginal cost of investment is
0. In a more general model (in particular without the L-shaped marginal cost curve), un-
derinvestment would occur and also discourage outsourcing. Given (9), the equilibrium








δLT(η + γa + Ta) − φk
¶
¯ At−1. (10)







That is, the larger a, i.e., the closer the country is to the technological frontier, the
higher the value of innovating and therefore the higher the private beneﬁt of outsourcing.
Intuitively, outsourcing becomes privately more costly for the owner as a increases, since
greater a implies greater output, which is being shared with the supplier. On the other
hand, as a increases, innovation becomes more important, and the value of outsourcing
increases. Assumption (A1) ensures that the second eﬀects dominates the ﬁrst.
3.2 Distance to frontier and vertical integration
We now determine the equilibrium integration decision as a function of the country’s
distance to the technological frontier (measured by a). The owners (capitalists) decide
whether to remain integrated or outsource production activities. Therefore, to determine
the equilibrium organizational form we need to compare uVI(a) given by (8) to uNI(a)
given in (10).6
6Because production activities are outsourced to suppliers who have no wealth, contracts requiring
upfront payments from suppliers to owners are not possible. Contracts where potential suppliers promise
ex post payments are ruled out by our incomplete contracts assumption.






VI(0) = δLTη − k (11)
(recall that φ ≥ 1/2). Thus in economies far away from the world technology fron-
tier, owners prefer to remain vertically integrated: innovation is relatively unimportant
compared to imitation in these economies, so outsourcing has little beneﬁts, and high
private costs because of the holdup problem. This result holds despite the fact that
from a technological point of view, outsourcing is superior to vertical integration: there
is no opportunity cost for the supplier (as he still works in production), and there can
be greater investments in innovation. Nevertheless, from the owner’s point of view,
outsourcing has private costs, since the supplier shares some of the rents.
Setting uVI(av)=uNI(av) from (8) and (10), yields the critical threshold
a
v ≡
η − (1 − φ)k/δL
T − γ
. (12)
For all a<a v, equilibrium organizational form is vertical integration, and for a>a v,
there will be outsourcing. The threshold av is typically less than 1, so that there will be a
switch to outsourcing before reaching the technology frontier. Notice that av less than 1
is more likely when the ﬁxed production cost k is high, competition is high (i.e δ is small),
or a η is small. More generally, straightforward diﬀerentiation shows that ∂av/∂δ > 0
and ∂av/∂η ≥ 0, thus vertical integration is more likely in less competitive environments
and in sectors where imitation is relatively more important. Less competition creates
greater rents, increasing the holdup cost of outsourcing part of the activities. Also when
imitation is more important, the innovation beneﬁts of outsourcing are less pronounced
relative to the rent sharing costs.
Proposition 1 In economies with distance to frontier a<a v, the equilibrium organiza-
tional form is vertical integration, and when a>a v, ﬁrms switch to outsourcing, where
av is given by (12). Greater competition, i.e., lower δ, and less scope for imitation, i.e.,
lower η,r e d u c eav and make outsourcing more likely.
3.3 Vertical integration, growth, and non-convergence traps
S of a rw eh a v ed i s c u s s e dt h ee ﬀect of the state of technology, and the growth process, on
equilibrium organizational forms. Next we analyze the eﬀects of organizational forms, in
9particular of integration/outsourcing decisions, on the equilibrium growth rate. Consider
ﬁrst an economy with at <a v, where equilibrium organizational form is vertical inte-






In contrast, in a country with at >a v, owners will outsource production activities, so
innovations take place at the rate γ +xNI(a)=γ +T. As a result, the law of motion of




(η +( γ + T))at). (14)
Comparing (13) and (14), we see that the economy with outsourcing always grows faster.7
This reﬂects the fact that from a technological point of view, outsourcing is superior,
and in equilibrium vertical integration emerges because owners do not want to share the
rents with suppliers.
Near the frontier, the maximum growth rate of the economy must be the same as
that of the frontier, thus we must also have
η + γ + T =1+g. (A2)
Given (A2), equation (14) implies that an economy with outsourcing always converges
towards the world technology frontier, i.e., (γ + T)/(1 + g) < 1.
An economy with vertically integrated ﬁrms, on the other hand, not only grows at a
slower rate than an identical economy with outsourcing, but may also stop converging
towards the world technology frontier. To analyze this, ﬁrst observe that (13) intersects









< 1 immediately follows from assumption (A3). When at = atrap,
an economy with vertical integration stops growing. Therefore, a vertically-integrated
economy will be stuck in a non-convergence trap at atrap.
7It is straightforward generalize this model, so that vertically integrated ﬁrms are more successful
in imitation, i.e., they have ηVI > ηNI. In this case, somewhat more reminiscent to AAZ, at the early
stages of development, an economy with vertical integration will grow faster than an economy with
outsourcing, while closer to the frontier, outsourcing will produce faster growth.
10This does not, however, establish that an equilibrium with a non-convergence trap
exists. It might indeed be the case that an economy switches out of vertical integration
before atrap. Therefore, the condition for an equilibrium non-convergence trap is that
atrap <a v where av is given by (12).
When atrap <a v, economies that start with a0 <a v will always stay with vertically
integrated ﬁrms, and never converge to the technology level of the world frontier, whereas
economies with a0 >a v grow faster and converge the world technology frontier. Since
av is increasing in δ, such traps are more likely in less competitive economies (e.g., in
economies where government policy discourages entry). Conversely, in economies with
atrap <a v, government policy, for example by increasing competition, i.e., reducing δ,
may prevent non-convergence traps.
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